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Abstract 
Our paper explores the relationship between inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and within-occupation wage 
inequality at the state level in the U.S. We argue that sectoral FDI may affect different occupations differently, 
and our study looks at possible heterogeneous effects of sectoral FDI on wage inequality for 22 occupations. 
Using data over 1999–2007, our results show that state-level manufacturing FDI tends to reduce wage 
inequality, measured by the ratio of the 90th percentile wage and the 10th percentile wage in an occupation. 
Manufacturing FDI is significantly associated with less wage inequality in the production occupations and the 
construction and extraction occupations. In contrast, non-manufacturing FDI is associated with increased within-
occupation wage inequality in the arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations, as well as the 
transportation and material moving occupations. Non-manufacturing FDI is associated with decreased wage 
inequality in the sales and related occupations. 
KEYWORDS: Foreign direct investment, within-occupation income inequality, manufacturing FDI, non-
manufacturing FDI 
I. Introduction 
Studies on the economic growth effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations (MNCs) 
abound. The distributional consequences of FDI, however, are largely under-explored. As Figini and Gӧrg (2011) 
state, ‘FDI may bring benefits to the economy in which they locate, but it is unclear whether everyone will 
benefit to the same extent or indeed whether some will be better off while others will suffer from this’. 
In this article, we study the relationship between U.S. inward FDI and within-occupation wage inequality at the 
state level. While the U.S. is the largest FDI recipient globally, the literature on effects of FDI in the U.S. remains 
surprisingly small, especially at the subnational level.11 A few notable exceptions include Blonigen and Figlio 
(2000), Bode, Nunnenkamp, and Waldkirch (2012), Ford and Rork (2010), Mullen and Williams (2007), and 
Zhuang (2013).View all notes Further, theoretical predictions regarding the FDI-inequality nexus are not entirely 
clear. The endowment-driven model suggests that if foreign affiliates are more productive than U.S. domestic 
firms, FDI raises U.S. demand for skilled-labour relative to unskilled labour as well as the skill premium (Feenstra 
and Hanson 1997), resulting in greater income inequality. In contrast, the knowledge-capital model argues that 
MNCs’ headquarter services at home are more skilled-labour intensive than their plant operations in foreign 
hosts (Carr, Markusen, and Maskus 2001). Foreign affiliates’ plant-level production in the U.S. is less skilled-
labour intensive than the composite rest of the U.S. economy, which often provides headquarter services to 
other countries (Chintrakarn, Herzer, and Nunnenkamp 2012). Consequently, inward FDI is expected to dampen 
income inequality in the U.S. 
To the best of our knowledge, Chintrakarn, Herzer, and Nunnenkamp (2012) is the only published research on 
FDI and U.S. state-level income inequality. With data over 1977–2001, the authors find that aggregate FDI 
reduces the income share of the top 10% income earners at the state level in the long run, yet the short-run 
effect of FDI is insignificant. 
Complementing Chintrakarn, Herzer, and Nunnenkamp (2012), we focus on sectoral FDI and within-occupation 
wage inequality for 22 occupations at the state level. U.S. manufacturing receives more inward FDI than any 
other sector (Saha, Fikri, and Marchio 2014). Arguably, manufacturing and non-manufacturing FDI could have 
different impacts on income inequality. In addition, although it is possible that FDI can affect all income earners, 
one would expect that some occupations are more affected by certain foreign investment than other 
occupations. For instance, manufacturing FDI might affect the wage distribution of production workers rather 
than those in arts and entertainment. 
II. Model and data 
Our empirical estimation is based on the following model: 
log(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1log�𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽2log�𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼 −𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛾𝛾′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
where 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the ratio of the 90th percentile wage to the 10th percentile wage of occupation i, state j, 
and year t. Our main variables of interest 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼 −𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represent inward FDI in 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, respectively. Both are measured by the value of property, plants 
and equipment of U.S. affiliates of MNCs. The vector X in Equation (1) includes additional control variables that 
may affect occupational wage distribution (Kim and Sakamoto 2008); 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 are state and time dummies, 
respectively. 
Other determinants in the vector X include: occupational employment share (empshareijt), gross state product 
(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), inflation rate as the percentage change in state GSP deflator (𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), unemployment rate 
(𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), share of population over the age of 25 with a college education or above (𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), total population 
(𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), share of population living in urban areas (𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), value of exports (𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), and total state and local 
government expenditure (𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). Controls in vector X are all measured at the state level except 𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
which is an occupation-level variable capturing the employment in occupation i, state j, and year t as a share of 
the total occupational employment in the U.S. in year t. 
Our sample consists of 50 states and Washington D.C. over 1999–2007. We obtain wage data for 22 occupations 
from the Occupational Employment Statistics Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). FDI data are from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Data on other control variables are from the BEA, the BLS, and the Census 
Bureau. The sample time span is solely determined by data availability. The BLS started to use its current 
occupational classification system in 1999 and state-level sectoral FDI data are available from the BEA till 
2007. Table 1 reports summary statistics of variables. Figure 1 illustrates the 90th/10th wage ratio by 
occupations. 
Table 1. Summary statistics. 
Variables Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
log(inequality) 9758 1.09 0.242 0.232 2.274 
log(manuFDI) 10,088 8.398 1.346 4.205 11.053 
log(non-manuFDI) 10,088 8.681 1.125 5.38 11.318 
log(Export) 10,088 8.606 1.387 5.255 11.838 
empshare 10,052 0.02 0.024 0 0.439 
log(GSP) 10,088 11.837 1.033 9.847 14.383 
log(pop) 10,088 1.234 1.035 -0.751 3.59 
college 10,088 0.173 0.038 0.104 0.332 
log(gov) 10,088 10.108 1.026 8.117 12.875 
urate 10,088 0.047 0.011 0.023 0.081 
inflation 10,088 0.027 0.018 -0.019 0.169 
urban 10,088 0.728 0.15 0.376 1 
 
Figure 1. Occupational wage inequality over time. 
 
III. Results and discussions 
We estimate each of the 22 occupational wage regressions using fixed effects and dynamic generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimators, and report coefficients on FDI in Table 2. Occupation codes are illustrated 
in Figure 1. Detailed regression results are available in the Appendix, Tables A1-A2. One might argue that inward 
FDI may influence within-occupation wage inequality in a state while at the same time state-level wage 
inequality also affects MNCs location decisions. Therefore, we employ the GMM estimator and instrument the 
potentially endogenous FDI and lagged dependent variable using their second to eighth lags. 
Table 2. Effects of FDI on wage inequality. 
 
Manufacturing FDI Non-manufacturing FDI 
  
Occupation code FE Dynamic GMM FE Dynamic GMM 
11 0.039 0.183 0.006 0.042  
[0.023] [0.264] [0.015] [0.198] 
13 -0.023** -0.022 -0.024* 0.039 
  [0.010] [0.079] [0.014] [0.120] 
15 -0.018 0.247 0.019 -0.046 
  [0.020] [0.362] [0.020] [0.364] 
17 0.01 0.017 -0.007 -0.117 
  [0.011] [0.208] [0.016] [0.154] 
19 -0.033 -0.126 -0.015 0.029 
  [0.020] [0.212] [0.018] [0.271] 
21 -0.01 0 -0.004 -0.008 
  [0.023] [0.254] [0.016] [0.090] 
23 0.032 0.26 0.038 0.25 
  [0.070] [1.783] [0.063] [1.052] 
25 -0.002 0.06 0.001 0 
  [0.019] [0.239] [0.017] [0.080] 
27 0.013 -0.040 0.035* 0.061** 
  [0.023] [0.036] [0.019] [0.029] 
29 0.032 0.171 0.031 0.186 
  [0.020] [0.785] [0.019] [0.339] 
31 0 -0.353 -0.004 -0.206 
  [0.010] [0.544] [0.015] [0.306] 
33 -0.01 0.171 0.004 -0.044 
  [0.015] [0.265] [0.016] [0.189] 
35 -0.008 0.087 0.002 -0.071 
  [0.017] [0.175] [0.013] [0.204] 
37 -0.006 0.058 0.016 0.037 
  [0.013] [0.134] [0.010] [0.103] 
39 -0.012 0.061 0.013 -0.06 
  [0.024] [0.293] [0.023] [0.307] 
41 -0.02 0.021 -0.028* -0.029** 
  [0.022] [0.020] [0.015] [0.012] 
43 -0.009 0.064 0.006 0.104 
  [0.006] [0.165] [0.005] [0.166] 
45 -0.077 -1.085 0.028 -0.166 
  [0.049] [1.212] [0.032] [0.375] 
47 -0.026* -0.039* -0.004 0.003 
  [0.015] [0.023] [0.009] [0.026] 
49 -0.002 -0.089 -0.022* -0.009 
  [0.016] [0.181] [0.012] [0.152] 
51 -0.027* -0.026* -0.009 0.035* 
  [0.014] [0.014] [0.010] [0.020] 
53 -0.019 -0.029 0.021*** 0.038** 
  [0.017] [0.031] [0.007] [0.014] 
 
Table 2 shows considerable heterogeneity regarding the effect of state-level FDI on wage inequality. Fixed 
effects results show that manufacturing FDI has a significantly negative effect on the wage gap in 3 of the 22 
occupation regressions, namely, business and financial operations occupations, construction and extraction 
occupations, and production occupations. The coefficients on manufacturing FDI in other regressions are often 
negative, but not significant at conventional levels. In comparison, the coefficient on non-manufacturing FDI is 
negative and significant in three regressions, including business and financial operations occupations, sales and 
related occupations, and installation, maintenance, and repair occupations. The coefficient on non-
manufacturing FDI is positive and significant for two occupations – arts, design, entertainment, sports, and 
media occupations and transportation and material moving occupations. 
The GMM results are, in general, similar to the fixed effects results. Manufacturing FDI has a negative and 
significant effect in two occupations. Non-manufacturing FDI has a positive effect on wage inequality in 3 of the 
22 regressions and a negative effect in one regression. 
For ease of comparison, we highlight in bold the coefficient on FDI that is least sensitive to model specifications 
and consistent across both estimators, in terms of the sign of the coefficient and its statistical significance. The 
effects of manufacturing FDI are robust and consistent in construction and extraction occupations (occupation 
code: 47) and production occupations (51). In both occupations, manufacturing FDI tends to decrease the gap 
between the 90th and 10th percentile occupational wages. Results regarding the effects of non-manufacturing 
FDI that are robust and consistent across both estimators are in arts, design, entertainment, sports and 
media occupations (27); sales and related occupations (41); and transportation and material 
moving occupations (53). As manufacturing and non-manufacturing FDI tends to affect within-occupation wage 
inequality differently in different occupations, our findings might provide a possible explanation to the 
insignificant short-run effect of total FDI on state-level income inequality in Chintrakarn, Herzer, and 
Nunnenkamp (2012). 
Since our wage inequality and FDI variables enter the regressions in log form, the estimated coefficient on FDI 
represents elasticity. The dynamic GMM estimates suggest that each year a 1% rise in manufacturing FDI in a 
state is associated with a 0.039% decrease in the gap between the 90th and 10th percentile wage in 
construction and extraction occupations, and a 0.026% decrease in that same gap in production 
occupations, ceteris paribus. For the two occupations for which non-manufacturing FDI is shown to have a 
robustly positive effect on wage inequality, a 1% rise in non-manufacturing FDI is associated with a 0.061% 
increase in the wage gap in arts occupations and a 0.038% increase in the wage gap in the transportation and 
material moving occupations. In sales occupations, a 1% rise in non-manufacturing FDI is associated with a 
0.029% decrease in the wage gap according to the GMM results. These coefficients are small but economically 
meaningful, considering the slow-moving nature of wage gaps in these occupations. 
The inequality-dampening effects of manufacturing FDI in production occupations are consistent with 
theoretical predictions from the knowledge-capital model. These results are important, as about 18.5% of 
manufacturing jobs in the U.S. are supported by FDI (Saha, Fikri, and Marchio 2014) and 63.9% of manufacturing 
FDI employment could be in production and related occupations (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1993). The 
inequality-increasing effects of non-manufacturing FDI in some occupations are interesting, especially since the 
share of non-manufacturing FDI in the U.S. has been rising over time. An important direction for future research 
would be to look into the distributions of occupations in foreign-owned manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
establishments and further explore the underlying reasons for the heterogeneous effects of FDI on income 
distributions. Such future research may depend on more recent data being made available to the general public. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Fixed effects estimation of within-occupation wage inequality. 
-  -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 -11 
Occupation 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 
log(manuFDI) 0.039 - 0.023** -0.018 0.01 -0.033 -0.010 0.032 -0.002 0.013 0.032 -0.000 
-  [0.023] [0.010] [0.020] [0.011] [0.020] [0.023] [0.070] [0.019] [0.023] [0.020] [0.010] 
log(non-manuFDI) 0.006 -0.024* 0.019 -0.007 -0.015 -0.004 0.038 0.001 0.035* 0.031 -0.004 
-  [0.015] [0.014] [0.020] [0.016] [0.018] [0.016] [0.063] [0.017] [0.019] [0.019] [0.015] 
log(Export) 0.008 0.022 -0.004 -0.032* 0.015 0.009 0.052 -0.020 0.05 -0.078** -0.036** 
-  [0.029] [0.014] [0.026] [0.018] [0.023] [0.017] [0.073] [0.029] [0.035] [0.033] [0.017] 
empshare 10.419*** -0.725 1.478 0.551 7.740** 1.34 5.35 1.49 3.827 0.874 -3.394** 
-  [3.422] [2.318] [2.190] [2.663] [3.247] [2.683] [5.175] [1.527] [2.720] [3.306] [1.404] 
log(GSP) -0.152 -0.049 -0.025 0.095 -0.057 -0.123 0.16 0.068 -0.191 0.176 -0.080 
-  [0.144] [0.117] [0.145] [0.137] [0.233] [0.160] [0.397] [0.125] [0.160] [0.240] [0.112] 
log(pop) 0.238 0.423** -0.077 -0.023 0.279 0.325* 0.15 -0.280 -0.035 0.115 -0.046 
-  [0.279] [0.159] [0.282] [0.204] [0.263] [0.176] [0.420] [0.233] [0.289] [0.410] [0.218] 
college 0.372 -0.426** -0.298 0.159 0.176 -0.153 0.072 0.395 0.297 0.033 -0.515* 
-  [0.347] [0.206] [0.263] [0.214] [0.409] [0.318] [0.940] [0.297] [0.341] [0.451] [0.260] 
log(gov) -0.004 -0.050 -0.113 0.006 -0.092 -0.118 0.516* -0.249** 0.034 -0.217 0.011 
-  [0.136] [0.087] [0.214] [0.100] [0.130] [0.091] [0.279] [0.124] [0.135] [0.184] [0.111] 
urate 0.195 0.083 -0.751 0.214 0.719 -0.968* -1.483 -1.104 0.122 -1.031 0.284 
-  [0.996] [0.501] [0.819] [0.781] [0.817] [0.564] [2.151] [0.667] [0.935] [0.966] [0.864] 
inflation -0.196 -0.246** -0.409 -0.003 -0.075 0.283 -0.954** 0.330** 0.154 0.071 0.098 
-  [0.232] [0.109] [0.453] [0.172] [0.164] [0.206] [0.432] [0.144] [0.197] [0.208] [0.138] 
urban 1.478 -1.247 -0.417 0.695 -0.486 -0.335 -0.554 -0.400 -0.729 0.256 1.342 
-  [1.421] [0.766] [1.345] [0.979] [0.973] [0.815] [2.214] [0.898] [1.263] [1.279] [0.901] 
Constant 1.323 2.831 2.929 -0.384 2.83 3.564* -6.006 3.667** 2.854 1.133 1.081 
-  [2.238] [1.690] [2.636] [1.916] [2.727] [1.863] [6.506] [1.808] [2.372] [2.997] [2.016] 
Observations 306 458 459 457 458 455 290 451 458 458 458 
R-squared 0.2 0.14 0.12 0.1 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.2 0.15 
 
Table A1. (Continued). 
-  -12 -13 -14 -15 -16 -17 -18 -19 -20 -21 -22 
Occupation 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 
log(manuFDI) -0.010 -0.008 -0.006 -0.012 -0.020 -0.009 -0.077 -0.026* -0.002 -0.027* -0.019 
-  [0.015] [0.017] [0.013] [0.024] [0.022] [0.006] [0.049] [0.015] [0.016] [0.014] [0.017] 
log(non-manuFDI) 0.004 0.002 0.016 0.013 -0.028* 0.006 0.028 -0.004 -0.022* -0.009 0.021*** 
-  [0.016] [0.013] [0.010] [0.023] [0.015] [0.005] [0.032] [0.009] [0.012] [0.010] [0.007] 
log(Export) 0.027 0.011 0.021 0.022 0.042** 0.016** 0.027 0.017* -0.020 0.006 -0.023 
-  [0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.036] [0.017] [0.007] [0.039] [0.010] [0.016] [0.013] [0.016] 
empshare 1.428 -1.030 -3.013 -13.133*** 4.388* 6.983** -2.783* -1.691 5.413* 0.057 4.042*** 
-  [3.435] [5.439] [5.033] [3.741] [2.405] [3.007] [1.422] [1.258] [2.895] [1.357] [1.468] 
log(GSP) 0.047 -0.182 -0.120 0.292 -0.226 -0.130** -0.488* 0.112 -0.159* -0.152 -0.271*** 
-  [0.141] [0.115] [0.131] [0.253] [0.143] [0.063] [0.249] [0.094] [0.094] [0.097] [0.080] 
log(pop) -0.136 0.113 -0.166 -0.369 -0.415** 0.195** 0.542* -0.080 0.037 0.248 -0.075 
-  [0.242] [0.207] [0.176] [0.381] [0.187] [0.095] [0.282] [0.122] [0.110] [0.154] [0.144] 
college -0.291 -0.726** -0.261 -0.185 -0.624** -0.145 -0.993* 0.306 0.013 0.226 0.121 
-  [0.306] [0.285] [0.222] [0.423] [0.308] [0.131] [0.575] [0.191] [0.230] [0.186] [0.166] 
log(gov) -0.004 0.276** 0.190** 0.456** 0.163 -0.050 0.288 0.035 -0.149** -0.022 0.159* 
-  [0.133] [0.124] [0.094] [0.183] [0.100] [0.074] [0.178] [0.073] [0.066] [0.079] [0.080] 
urate -0.848* -0.796 -1.292** -0.120 -0.239 0.066 -1.312 0.213 -0.444 -0.566 -0.862** 
-  [0.490] [0.552] [0.504] [1.642] [0.673] [0.323] [1.311] [0.463] [0.452] [0.412] [0.347] 
inflation 0.092 0.073 0.320** 1.035*** 0.197* -0.138** 0.47 0.004 -0.294* -0.202 0.178 
-  [0.099] [0.117] [0.127] [0.269] [0.104] [0.065] [0.466] [0.110] [0.147] [0.159] [0.116] 
urban 1.580* 2.564*** 3.161*** 2.498 2.977*** 0.536 -0.477 0.415 1.912** 1.619** 1.751** 
-  [0.921] [0.862] [0.792] [1.631] [0.931] [0.389] [1.556] [0.860] [0.785] [0.722] [0.864] 
Constant -0.437 -1.797 -1.875 -8.243** 0.853 2.116** 3.978 -0.790 3.263** 1.835 1.686 
-  [2.333] [1.984] [1.751] [3.872] [2.083] [0.850] [3.176] [1.385] [1.259] [1.312] [1.683] 
Observations 459 459 458 454 454 459 443 456 459 457 459 
R-squared 0.17 0.46 0.39 0.17 0.55 0.35 0.18 0.1 0.18 0.15 0.17 
 
  
Table A2. Dynamic GMM estimation of within-occupation wage inequality. 
  -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 -11 
Occupation 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 
log(manuFDI) 0.183 -0.022 0.247 0.017 -0.126 -0.000 0.26 0.06 -0.040 0.171 -0.353 
  [0.264] [0.079] [0.362] [0.208] [0.212] [0.254] [1.783] [0.239] [0.036] [0.785] [0.544] 
log(non-manuFDI) 0.042 0.039 -0.046 -0.117 0.029 -0.008 0.25 0 0.061** 0.186 -0.206 
  [0.198] [0.120] [0.364] [0.154] [0.271] [0.090] [1.052] [0.080] [0.029] [0.339] [0.306] 
log(Export) -0.130 -0.077 -0.172 -0.000 -0.034 0.038 0.214 -0.044 0.016 -0.171 0.04 
  [0.141] [0.110] [0.308] [0.068] [0.106] [0.141] [0.456] [0.236] [0.025] [0.455] [0.178] 
empshare 4.729 40.538 20.014 0.478 21.402 18.197 159.084 23.422 0.204 40.402 31.757 
  [60.513] [49.172] [105.698] [36.905] [34.449] [25.087] [805.080] [39.528] [0.472] [136.354] [72.769] 
log(GSP) -0.116 0.971 1.794 -0.029 -0.533 -0.575 4.268 2.037 -0.007 -0.768 -0.044 
  [2.208] [1.577] [4.767] [0.722] [2.444] [2.275] [5.945] [5.884] [0.073] [2.186] [1.289] 
log(pop) 1.065 0.156 1.089 -0.447 0.169 -0.377 -5.353 -1.272 0.123* 0.936 -1.033 
  [1.977] [1.646] [2.709] [1.073] [1.299] [1.604] [7.730] [3.759] [0.071] [5.637] [1.969] 
college 3.743 2.612 4.959 -0.425 1.556 -0.454 0.826 -2.242 -0.093 -9.954 2.653 
  [8.228] [2.590] [14.477] [2.659] [2.859] [6.335] [6.873] [14.108] [0.307] [8.936] [3.586] 
log(gov) -1.273 -1.079 -3.300 -0.018 1.046 0.733 1.817 -1.100 -0.098 -1.565 1.095 
  [3.096] [1.281] [3.436] [0.692] [3.118] [4.141] [7.440] [2.050] [0.106] [8.955] [1.788] 
urate 6.575 7.259 17.023 3.54 2.515 -2.479 0.312 -3.864 -1.204 -22.360 10.303 
  [14.785] [6.607] [20.676] [7.317] [5.639] [11.767] [29.697] [32.686] [0.790] [22.490] [10.952] 
inflation 1.845 0.075 1.101 -0.062 -1.854 -2.303 -0.700 -2.575 -0.052 -1.163 -0.276 
  [6.319] [1.449] [5.056] [1.854] [1.970] [2.736] [3.996] [8.224] [0.132] [2.294] [1.376] 
urban 1.165 -3.791 -0.141 1.157 -2.915 -0.239 -8.840 -0.949 -0.104 4.892 -4.881 
  [2.925] [2.859] [8.951] [3.657] [4.231] [2.186] [27.394] [2.458] [0.150] [16.768] [6.959] 
Lagged 90th/10th wage ratio 0.626 0.506 0.587 -0.324 0.111 0.491 -0.514 -0.035 0.515** -0.106 0.131 
  [0.796] [0.547] [0.457] [0.400] [0.479] [0.666] [1.245] [0.736] [0.205] [2.024] [0.927] 
Observations 258 407 408 406 407 403 238 395 407 406 407 
Hansen p-value 0.869 0.569 0.319 0.561 0.338 0.315 0.747 0.487 0.189 0.679 0.599 
AR(2) p-value 0.626 0.783 0.569 0.739 0.398 0.729 0.709 0.719 0.195 0.264 0.791 
 
  
Table A2. (Continued). 
  -12 -13 -14 -15 -16 -17 -18 -19 -20 -21 -22 
Occupation 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 
log(manuFDI) 0.171 0.087 0.058 0.061 0.021 0.064 -1.085 -0.039* -0.089 -0.026* -0.029 
  [0.265] [0.175] [0.134] [0.293] [0.020] [0.165] [1.212] [0.023] [0.181] [0.014] [0.031] 
log(non-manuFDI) -0.044 -0.071 0.037 -0.060 -0.029** 0.104 -0.166 0.003 -0.009 0.035* 0.038** 
  [0.189] [0.204] [0.103] [0.307] [0.012] [0.166] [0.375] [0.026] [0.152] [0.020] [0.014] 
log(Export) -0.001 -0.024 -0.034 0.175 -0.019 0.002 0.033 0.02 -0.127 0.008 0.027 
  [0.165] [0.087] [0.064] [0.174] [0.014] [0.132] [0.683] [0.014] [0.081] [0.027] [0.020] 
empshare -10.165 7.065 20.017 -47.580 0.134 15.238 -14.375 -0.598* 27.199 -0.891 -0.035 
  [53.520] [18.561] [35.665] [66.421] [0.328] [60.777] [17.213] [0.326] [80.599] [1.354] [0.312] 
log(GSP) -0.604 1.208 -0.459 2.503 0.036 -0.001 -0.600 -0.029 -1.307 0.045 0.015 
  [1.382] [1.349] [0.664] [1.849] [0.039] [1.266] [5.836] [0.092] [1.442] [0.067] [0.049] 
log(pop) 0.93 -1.108 -0.162 -1.634 -0.046* 0.668 0.054 -0.035 0.915 -0.049 0.085*** 
  [1.614] [0.850] [0.662] [1.704] [0.023] [1.485] [7.476] [0.065] [0.864] [0.106] [0.029] 
college 4.563 -4.061** -2.111 -0.380 0.008 -2.443 -1.938 -0.309 3.297 -0.288 0.046 
  [8.176] [1.937] [2.072] [3.409] [0.151] [4.704] [11.934] [0.450] [3.778] [0.286] [0.248] 
log(gov) -0.728 -0.193 0.393 0.073 0.036 -1.461 2.404 0.109 0.162 0.021 -0.126** 
  [2.096] [1.546] [1.219] [2.307] [0.040] [1.462] [5.119] [0.152] [1.395] [0.099] [0.052] 
urate 4.578 2.162 -1.315 13.784 0.527 -2.712 -12.955 0.405 1.259 -1.568 -0.320 
  [10.179] [6.656] [3.010] [8.426] [0.478] [8.908] [35.041] [1.129] [7.933] [1.284] [0.499] 
inflation 0.972 -0.817 0.21 1.632 -0.077 -1.062 6.883 -0.004 -0.448 -0.434 0.043 
  [2.236] [0.972] [0.601] [1.828] [0.139] [1.380] [15.463] [0.147] [1.650] [0.282] [0.177] 
urban 3.374 -0.767 -0.198 -2.324 0.058 2.556 -6.011 0.04 -0.662 -0.175 -0.116 
  [6.339] [2.630] [3.335] [3.773] [0.065] [5.263] [6.908] [0.121] [4.380] [0.123] [0.088] 
Lagged 90th/10th wage ratio 0.187 0.347 0.169 0.585 0.901*** -0.372 -0.488 0.637** --0.171 0.884*** 1.034*** 
   "[0.883]" [0.667] [0.352] [0.506] [0.100] [1.163] [1.983] [0.296] [0.618] [0.081] [0.139] 
Observations 408 408 406 402 402 408 392 405 408 405 408 
Hansen p-value 0.29 0.65 0.0644 0.408 0.132 0.431 0.684 0.14 0.482 0.477 0.261 




1 A few notable exceptions include Blonigen and Figlio (2000), Bode, Nunnenkamp, and Waldkirch (2012), Ford 
and Rork (2010), Mullen and Williams (2007), and Zhuang (2013). 
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